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Abstract
This Comment argues that, based on existing case law, the Second Circuit improperly held that
the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign takeover attempt in its Gold Fields
decision. Part I examines the legal principles that govern the extraterritorial application of U.S.
securities laws. Part II presents the factual background of Gold Fields and the legal analysis of the
decision. Part III argues that the Second Circuit incorrectly exercised subject matter jurisdiction
over the foreign securities claim. This Comment concludes that U.S. courts should decline to
exercise subject matter jurisdiction in securities cases where domestic interests are insignificant in
comparison to foreign interests.
COMMENTS
CONSOLIDATED GOLD FIELDS PLC v. MINORCO, S.A.:
THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
U.S. SECURITIES LAWS IN
INTERNATIONAL EQUITIES
MARKETS
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in
Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A. ' that the district
court had subject matter jurisdiction in a case arising from a
takeover attempt between a Luxembourg bidder and a U.K.
target.2 As a result of this decision, a U.S. court essentially
1. 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989).
2. Id. at 263. The plaintiffs in this case are Consolidated Gold Fields PLC
("Gold Fields"), Gold Fields Mining Corporation ("Gold Fields Mining"), Newmont
Mining Corporation ("Newmont"), and Newmont Gold Company ("Newmont
Gold"). Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Anglo Am. Corp., 698 F. Supp. 487
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, sub nom. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v.
Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989), on remand
713 F. Supp. 1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
Gold Fields, the target, is a British corporation and is the world's second largest
non-communist producer of gold (12% of the market). Id. at 490. Gold Fields Min-
ing is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in New York. Id. It is a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Gold Fields and has mines in California and Nevada. Id.; see
Brief for Appellee at 4-5, Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d
252 (2d Cir. 1989) (Nos. 88-7932, 88-7934) [hereinafter Appellee's Briefn.
Newmont is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in New York. Gold
Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 490. Gold Fields owns a 49.3% equity interest in Newmont
that is subject to a standstill agreement. Id. at 491. Pursuant to this agreement, Gold
Fields received certain measures of control over Newmont's fundamental business
planning in return for Gold Fields' promise not to acquire more than 49.9% of the
outstanding common stock of Newmont. Id. The agreement binds only Gold Fields
and not Minorco. Id. Newmont Gold is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters
in New York. Id. at 490. Newmont Gold is the largest U.S. producer of gold. Id.
The defendants are Minorco, S.A. ("Minorco"), Anglo American Corporation of
South Africa Limited ("Anglo"), and De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited ("De
Beers"). Id. at 490-91.
Minorco, the bidder, is a Luxembourg socirt anonyme with over one-third of its
holdings in the United States. Id. at 490. Minorco's U.S. holdings are valued at
US$650 million, but it does not operate any of these companies in which it has an
interest. See infra notes 71-79 and accompanying text (discussing Minorco).
Anglo is a South African corporation with its headquarters in South Africa and
offices in England. Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 491. Anglo is the largest non-commu-
nist producer of gold and it owns 39.1% of Minorco. Id.; Brief for Appellant at 4,
Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1989) (Nos.
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halted a takeover attempt initiated in the United Kingdom for a
U.K. corporation.3 The decision is controversial because this
merger, which had the approval of the British Mergers and
Monopolies Commission,4 was enjoined and effectively pre-
vented by a U.S. court.
This Comment argues that, based on existing case law, the
Second Circuit improperly held that the district court had sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over a foreign takeover attempt in its
Gold Fields decision. Part I examines the legal principles that
govern the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws.
Part II presents the factual background of Gold Fields and the
legal analysis of the decision. Part III argues that the Second
Circuit incorrectly exercised subject matter jurisdiction over
the foreign securities claim. This Comment concludes that
U.S. courts should decline to exercise subject matter jurisdic-
tion in securities cases where domestic interests are insignifi-
cant in comparison to foreign interests.
88-7932, 88-7934) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief]. This interest would drop to
26.6% were the merger between Gold Fields and Minorco to occur. Brief of Defend-
ant at 4, Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 698 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (No. 88 Civ. 7191 (MBM)) [hereinafter Defendant's Brief]. Anglo did not file a
brief in the present case. See Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 489.
De Beers is a South African corporation with its headquarters in South Africa
and offices in England. Id. at 491. De Beers mines and markets 80% of the world's
diamond supply. Appellee's Brief, supra, at 6. De Beers has a 21% stake in Minorco
that would drop to 14% were the merger between Gold Fields and Minorco to occur.
Appellant's Brief, supra, at 9. De Beers also did not file a brief in the present case. See
Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 489.
3. Consgold Finds A Mate-British, Too, Bus. WK., July 17, 1989, at 72; Consgold
agrees to $5.5 billion offer from Hanson, THE REUTER Bus. REP., July 4, 1989. Reuter's
stated that "a British industry conglomerate Hanson PLC announced Tuesday that
ConsGold Fields PLC had agreed to accept its sweetened £3.5 billion, or $5.5 billion
takeover bid." Id.; see Regulation, Economics and Law, Foreign Investment, New Omnibus
Trade Law Said To Offer Weapon Against Foreign Takeover Bids, Daily Report for Execu-
tives (BNA), Nov. 11, 1988.
4. Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 254 n. 1; Minorco Presses UK Takeover Panel In Fight to
Acquire Consolidated Gold Fields, 56 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 724 (1989); EC
Community UK Agency Clear Bid By Minorco For Consolidated Gold Fields, 56 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 340 (1989).
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I. EXTRA TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S.
SECURITIES LA WS
A. Statutory Language and Legislative History of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934
The "presumption against extraterritoriality," a well-set-
tled rule of statutory construction, provides that unless a con-
trary intent appears, laws enacted by the U.S. Congress are to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.5 This principle is based upon the premise that Con-
gress is primarily concerned with applying U.S. law in its do-
mestic arena.6 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
"Act") 7 does not explicitly state the geographic limits of its ap-
plication, but its statutory language and legislative history sug-
gest that the primary purpose of the Act when enacted was the
protection of investors in U.S. markets.8
In construing a statute, courts first evaluate its plain lan-
guage.9 The Act grants exclusive jurisdiction to the district
courts over all actions brought to enforce the regulations
promulgated pursuant to it.'0 The express purposes of the Act
are to protect interstate commerce, the federal taxing power,
the Federal Reserve System, the national banking system, and
the national credit, and to maintain fair and honest markets."
5. Foley Bros. Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949); see Sandberg v. McDon-
ald, 248 U.S. 185, 195 (1918); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738
F.2d 487, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Compagnie De Saint-
Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1322-23 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
6. See, e.g., Filardo, 336 U.S. at 285 (noting that "canon of construction which
teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States .... is a valid ap-
proach whereby unexpressed congressional intent may be ascertained").
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988).
8. See id. Section 78(b) provides in part that "[for the reasons hereinafter enu-
merated, transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities ex-
changes and over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public interest
which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of such transactions
and of practices and matters related thereto." Id. § 78(b); see infra notes 16-18 and
accompanying text (discussing legislative history of Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
See generally Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1988).
9. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) (noting that "lan-
guage of a statute controls when sufficiently clear in its context").
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988).
11. Id. § 78b. Section 78b states that the express purposes of the Act are
to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanisms of a national market
system for securities and a national system for the clearance and settlement
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Section 30(b) of the Act specifically addresses extraterritorial
jurisdiction.' 2 The language of this section suggests that, in
principle, extraterritorial application is not absolutely neces-
sary. 3
Where a statute's language is inconclusive, courts next
rely on a statute's legislative history for evidence of congres-
sional intent.' 4 While the legislative history does not indicate
whether Congress intended the Act to have an extraterritorial
application, the legislative history does emphasize Congress'
concern with protecting U.S. securities markets and inves-
tors.' 5 Following the Great Depression and the speculation
that prevailed in the securities market during the 1920s,' 6 the
U.S. Congress sought to protect investors in domestic markets
of securities transactions and the safeguarding of securities and funds re-
lated thereto, and to impose requirements necessary to make such regula-
tion and control reasonably complete and effective, in order to protect inter-
state commerce, the national credit, the Federal taxing power, to protect
and make more effective the national banking system and Federal Reserve
System, and to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets in such
transactions.
Id.
12. See id. § 78dd(b). Section 30(b) of the Act provides that
[tihe provisions of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall
not apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities with-
oui the jurisdiction of the United States, unless he transacts such business in
co travention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of this chapter.
Id.; see Fidenas AG v. Compagnie Internationale pour L'Informatique CII Honeywell
Bull S.A., 606 F.2d 5, 9 (2d Cir. 1979); Curtis, The Extraterritorial Application of the
Federal Securities Code: A Further Analysis, 9 CONN. L. REV. 67, 68 (1977); see also Karmel,
The Extraterritorial Application of the Federal Securities Code, 7 CONN. L. REV. 669, 671
(1975).
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1988); Karmel, supra note 12, at 671-72 (stating
that section "30(b) excludes from the coverage of the Exchange Act foreign activities
in the ordinary course of a business in securities but not isolated securities transac-
tions").
14. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981); Palmer v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987).
15. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-16 (1934); S. REP.
No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-13 (1934).
16. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1-16 (1934). This report illus-
trates the intent of the Act through a letter to Hon. Sam Rayburn (Chairman, House
Committee on Interstate & Foreign Commerce) from President Franklin D.
Roosevelt with regard to the Act:
The people of this country are, in overwhelming majority, fully aware of
the fact that unregulated speculation in securities and in commodities was
one of the most important contributing factors in the artificial and unwar-
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through federal regulation of the country's securities ex-
changes. 7 In 1934, President Roosevelt stressed in a message
to Congress the importance of regulating the "national traffic"
in investment securities.' 8
B. Judicial Interpretations
Because of the dearth of conclusive statutory provisions
and legislative history on the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the
Act, U.S. courts have experienced difficulty in defining its pa-
rameters.' 9 Consequently, U.S. courts have developed two
tests in deciding whether to exercise subject matter jurisdic-
tion over foreign securities claims: the "conduct" test and the
"effects" test.20 U.S. courts apply both of these tests and the
ranted "boom" which had so much to do with the terrible conditions of the
years following 1929.
I have been definitely committed to definite regulation of exchanges
which deal in securities and commodities. In my message I stated, "it
should be our national policy to restrict, as far as possible, the use of these
exchanges for purely speculative operations."
Id. at 2.
17. Id. This report discusses the general purpose of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (the "Act") and notes that
[tlo reach the causes of the "unnecessary, unwise, and destructive specula-
tion" condemned by the President's message, this bill seeks to regulate the
stock exchange and the relationships of the investing public to corporations
which invite public investment by listing on such exchanges.
Id.
18. Id. at 1. The report contains President Roosevelt's February 9th, 1934
message to the U.S. Congress:
In my message to you last March proposing legislation for Federal su-
pervision of national traffic in investment securities I said: "This is but one
step in our broad purpose of protecting investors and depositors. It should
be followed by legislation relating to the better supervision of the purchase
and sale of all property dealt with on exchanges."
This Congress has performed a useful service in regulating the invest-
ment business on the part of financial houses and in protecting the investing
public in its acquisition of securities.
Id.; S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934).
19. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975). In discussing the absence of a statutory foundation for
extraterritorial application of securities laws, Judge Friendly stated that the court
"freely acknowledge[s] that if we were asked to point to language in the statutes, or
even in the legislative history, that compelled these conclusions, we would be unable
to respond." Id.; see supra notes 5, 10-14 and accompanying text (discussing pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality).
20. See infra notes 22-23, 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing conduct and
effects tests).
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satisfaction of the requirements of either test is sufficient for
the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction.21
1. The Conduct Test
Under the conduct test, jurisdiction is appropriate where
fraudulent statements or misrepresentations originate in the
United States and "directly cause" harm to investors, even if
reliance and damages occur abroad. 22 The U.S. courts of ap-
peal have interpreted and applied the conduct test in a variety
of ways.23
One view of the conduct test holds that where domestic
conduct is "incidental" or "merely preparatory" to the alleged
fraudulent acts, subject matter jurisdiction will not exist where
the bulk of activities are performed in foreign countries .24 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has adopted this
limited application of the conduct test,25 which requires that
21. See infra notes 22-69 and accompanying text (discussing how courts apply
both conduct and effects tests).
22. See, e.g., Bersch, 519 F.2d at 992-93. The Restatement (Second) of the For-
eign Relations Law of the United States recognizes the conduct test. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 17 (1965) [here-
inafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]. Section 17 of the Restatement (Second) provides:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its terri-
tory, whether or not such consequences are determined by the effects of the
conduct outside the territory, and
(b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized, in
its territory.
Id.; see Beuthe & Coyne, Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Transnational Securities Fraud Cases:
The Expanding Application of the Conduct Test, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 471, 472 (1984)
(suggesting that Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 511 F. Supp. 582 (C.D. Cal. 1981), "re-
flects a trend in favor of asserting jurisdiction over foreign securities fraud cases
solely on basis of fraudulent conduct in the United States"); Hacker & Rotunda, The
Extraterritorial Regulation of Foreign Business Under the U.S. Securities Laws, 59 N.C.L. REV.
643 (1981) ("The authors caution against broadly imposing U.S. regulatory provi-
sions upon the internal operations of a foreign business already subject to the regula-
tory authority of its domiciliary country."); Thomas, Extraterritorial Application of the
United States Securities Laws: The Need for a Balanced Policy, 7 J. CORP. L. 189, 190 (1982)
("U.S. courts must be sensitive to the fact that overzealous assertion of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction may, by alienating foreign countries, impede the SEC's ability to in-
vestigate fraud and enforce the securities laws.").
23. See infra notes 24, 27 & 31 and accompanying text (discussing different inter-
pretations of conduct test).
24. Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
25. See IIT, Int'l Invest. Trust v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir.
1975); see also F.O.F. Proprietary Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Young & Co., 400 F. Supp.
1219, 1222-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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domestic conduct constitute all of the elements of a securities
law violation in order for subject matter jurisdiction to be
proper.
26
Other circuits have adopted different approaches to the
conduct test. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit, for example, has exercised jurisdiction when domestic
conduct furthers a fraudulent scheme and is significant with
respect to its results.27 In Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd.
v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc. ,28 where U.S. defendants seeking to sell
the stock of an Australian company allegedly failed to disclose
material information in communicating from the United States
to an Australian buyer, the Eighth Circuit modified the Second
Circuit's interpretation. 29 In Continental Grain, the court exer-
cised subject matter jurisdiction based upon the defendant's
conduct within the United States, which furthered a "fraudu-
lent scheme."3 °
Likewise, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
has exercised jurisdiction where some U.S. conduct is designed
to further a fraudulent scheme. 31 In Securities & Exchange Com-
mission v. Kasser,32 U.S. defendants induced a Canadian corpo-
ration to purchase securities.33 The Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "SEC") did not claim that any effect had oc-
curred within the United States from the defendants' allegedly
fraudulent conduct.3 4 No U.S. citizens or residents purchased
the securities, none of the securities were traded on a U.S. ex-
change, and there was no measurable impact on the United
26. See Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 31; cf Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1018 (suggesting that juris-
diction "is limited to the perpetration of fraudulent acts themselves"); Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1335 (2d Cir. 1972) ("if defend-
ants' fraudulent acts [occurred] in the United States .. .it would be immaterial ...
that the damage resulted, not from the contract ...procured in this country, but
from interrelated action which he induced in England").
27. Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d
409, 418 (8th Cir. 1979).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 420.
30. Id. at 418.
31. Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114-15 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977); see Plessey Co. PLC v. General Elec. Co. PLC, 628 F.
Supp. 477, 494 (D. Del. 1986); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
494 F. Supp. 1161, 1187-88 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
32. 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
33. Id. at 110-11.
34. Id. at 112.
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States.3 5 The court, nevertheless, held that subject matter ju-
risdiction existed where defendants' conduct within the United
States was designed to further a fraudulent activity.3 6
2. The Effects Test
Under the traditional effects test, as set forth in the Re-
statement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States (the "Restatement (Second)"), a court exercises subject
matter jurisdiction where foreign conduct results in a substan-
tial, direct, and foreseeable effect or impact within the United
States." The rule of law to be applied must not be inconsis-
tent with the principles of fairness and justice generally recog-
nized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.3 8
Applying this to securities cases means a U.S. court will assert
jurisdiction when it is necessary for the protection of investors
in U.S. markets.3 9
35. Id.
36. Id. at 112, 114.
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 22, § 18. Section 18 of the Restatement
(Second) provides that
[a] state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal conse-
quences to conduct that occurs outside the territory and causes an effect
within the territory if either
(a) the conduct and its effects are generally recognized as constitutional
elements of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably
developed legal systems;
(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constitutional elements of activity to
which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within its territory is substantial; (iii) it
occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory;
and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally
recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
Id. (emphasis added); see Rosenthal,Jurisdictional Conflicts Between Sovereign Nations, 19
INT'L LAW. 487, 488 (1985) (noting that U.S. courts often rely on Restatement as
accurate articulation of international law); Case Comment, MCG, Inc. v. Great W. En-
ergy Corp., 84 AM.J. INT'L L. 755 (1990).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 22, § 18(b)(iv).
39. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds,
405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); see Tamari v.
Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1103, 1107-08 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 871 (1984). See generally INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MAR-
KETS: REPORT OF THE STAFF OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION TO
THE SENATE COMMITrEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS AND THE HOUSE
COMMITrEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE VII-5 - VII-7 (1987) (discussing evolution of'
effects test).
Jurisdiction based on the effects test is criticized by some in the international
community. See Moessle, The Basic Structure of United States Securities Law Enforcement in
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The leading U.S. case applying the effects test to securities
law is Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.4° In Schoenbaum, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit asserted subject matter juris-
diction in a derivative suit when the defendants' actions af-
fected the price of a company's common stock listed on the
American Stock Exchange (the "AMEX"). 4 ' This effect re-
sulted when the Canadian defendant issued stock to insiders in
Canada at an allegedly low price.42 Even though the court of
appeals found insufficient U.S. conduct to exercise jurisdiction,
it exercised jurisdiction because the stock, which had been reg-
istered on the AMEX, caused a "sufficiently serious" effect
upon investors in U.S. markets.4 3
In Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. ,44 the Second Circuit ap-
plied the effects test where a class of foreign investors and
some U.S. investors45 sued U.S. underwriters and accountants
who were involved in three European offerings of common
stock made by a group of foreign companies. 46 The court ana-
International Cases, 16 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1 (1986) (discussing how U.S. securities laws
have caused resentment abroad).
40. 405 F.2d 200, 208-09 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.
1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); see IIT, Int'l Invest. Trust v. Vencap,
Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 n.29 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Leasco Data Processing Equip.
Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972) ("When no fraud has been
practiced in this country and the purchase or sale has not been made here, we would
be hard pressed to find justification for going beyond Schoenbaum."); Thomas, Extra-
territoriality in an Era of Internationalization of the Securities Markets: The Need to Revisit
Domestic Policies, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 453, 458 (1983) (noting that some cases suggest
that Schoenbaum may represent outer limits of "effects" jurisdiction).
U.S. courts first applied the effects test in 1945. United States v. Aluminum Co.
of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.). In an opinion written by
Judge Learned Hand, the Second Circuit held that U.S. antitrust laws could be ap-
plied to foreign conduct resulting in substantial effects within the United States. Id.;
see Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1301 (3d Cir. 1979);
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 610 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
41. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 204-09.
42. Id. at 205.
43. Id. at 209. Judge Friendly wrote that "[w]e believe that Congress intended
the [Securities] Exchange Act [of 1934] to have extraterritorial application in order
to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on American
exchanges and to protect the domestic securities markets from the effects of im-
proper foreign transaction in American securities." Id. at 206.
44. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
45. As used in this Comment the term "U.S. investors" means investors who are
U.S. citizens or U.S. residents.
46. See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 979-80.
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lyzed the conduct engaged in by the defendants to determine
what effects had been caused in the United States.47 The pro-
spectus for the allegedly fraudulent securities expressly stated
that the shares were not being offered in the United States.48
47. Id. at 993. The court sought conduct within the United States as a basis for
subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 985-86. While two breakfast meetings were held at
the Carlyle Hotel in New York City during which the chief attorney for defendant
I.O.S., Ltd. ("IOS") discussed preliminarily the concept of IOS's going public, the
court concluded that these acts were insufficiently connected with the latter public
offering. Id. at 999. Further, the court noted that it "[saw] no reason to extend [sub-
ject matter jurisdiction] to cases where the U.S. activities are merely preparatoy or take
the form of culpable nonfeasance and are relatively small in comparison to those
abroad." Id. at 987 (emphasis added).
In discussing the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws, the court noted that "it
does not support subject matter jurisdiction if there was no intention that the securi-
ties should be offered to anyone in the United States, simply because in the long run
there was an adverse effect on this country's general economic interests or on Ameri-
can security prices." Id. at 989. The Bersch court, citing Judge Hand's opinion in
United States v. Aluminum Company of America, wrote
There may be agreements made beyond our borders not intended to affect
imports, which do affect them, or which affects exports. Almost any limita-
tion of the supply of goods in Europe, for example, or in South America,
may have repercussions in the United States if there is trade between the
two. Yet when one considers the international complications likely to arise
from an effort in this country to treat such agreements as unlawful, it is safe
to assume that Congress certainly did not intend the Act to cover them.
Bersch, 519 F.2d at 989 n.33 (citing United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d
416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945)).
The Bersch court set forth circumstances where U.S. laws would apply:
We have thus concluded that the anti-fraud provisions of the federal
securities laws:
(1) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident in the
United States whether or not acts (or culpable failures to act) of mate-
rial importance occurred in this country; and
(2) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident
abroad if, but only if, acts (or culpable failures to act) of material impor-
tance in the United States have significantly contributed thereto; but
(3) Do not apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners outside
the United States unless acts (or culpable failures to act) within the
United States directly caused such losses.
Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993.
48. Id. at 980. The court noted that the prospectus declared that the shares
"are not being offered in the United States of America or any of its territo-
ries or possessions or any area subject to its jurisdiction" and was "being
made to approximately 25,000 persons who are either (1) employees or
sales associates of the Company, (2) certain clients presently holding invest-
ments in managed funds or other products of the Company, or (3) persons
who have had a long-standing professional or business relationship with the
Company."
Id. (quoting prospectus).
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Despite Drexel's attempt to exclude U.S. investors, an esti-
mated 385 U.S. investors acquired the shares. 49 The court
considered the U.S. citizenship and residency of the affected
investors in applying U.S. securities laws to the predominantly
foreign transaction. 50 As a result, the court concluded that
"merely preparatory" conduct was sufficient to exercise sub-
ject matter jurisdiction since an effect had been caused abroad
upon the U.S. investors. 5'
The Second Circuit also applied the effects test in HT, Int'l
Invest. Trust v. Vencap, Ltd.,52 where U.S. citizens and residents
purchased securities in a particular trust.53 The shareholders
sued a corporation and individuals for selling allegedly fraudu-
lent securities to the trust.54 Although 300 U.S. residents and
citizens had invested in the trust (0.2% of the trust's
fundholders), the Second Circuit declined to exercise subject
matter jurisdiction based on the effects test.55 The court stated
that no "substantial" effect occurred within the United
States.56  The court, however, eventually exercised subject
matter jurisdiction because there was evidence that misrepre-
sentations and omissions occurred in the United States.57
Applying a different approach than the Restatement (Sec-
ond), the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States (the "Restatement (Third)") emphasizes the
requirement of either an intended substantial effect or an ac-
tual effect in conjunction with a balancing test based on a "rea-
49. Id. at 992 n.42.
50. See id. at 989.
51. Id. at 992. The Bersch court added that "[w]hen ...a court is confronted
with transactions that on any view are predominately foreign, it must seek to deter-
mine whether Congress would have wished the precious resources of United States
courts and law enforcement agencies to be devoted to them rather than leave the
problem to foreign countries." Id. at 985.
52. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
53. See id. at 1016-17. Plaintiff IIT, International Investment Trust was a Lux-
embourg trust. Id. at 1003. Defendant Vencap was a Bahamian corporation. Id. at
1005. The issue was the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws. Id. at
1003-04.
54. See id. at 1016.
55. Id. at 1016-17.
56. Id. at 1017.
57. Id. at 1017-18. The court stated that "[w]e do not think Congress intended
to allow the United States to be used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security
devices for export, even when these are peddled only to foreigners." Id. at 1017.
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sonableness inquiry."'5'  Through the "reasonableness" prong
of this effects test, the Restatement (Third) recognizes limita-
tions to the Restatement (Second)'s effects test where an asser-
tion of jurisdiction would be improper if it is deemed unrea-
sonable. 59 This rule of reason, however, is supported by very
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATION LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 402(2) & 403 [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. Section 402 provides that
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its ter-
ritory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its terri-
tory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substan-
tial effect within its territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as
well as within its territory; and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that
is directed against the security of the state or against a limited class
of other state interests.
Id. § 402. For the text of § 403, see infra note 59 (containing "reasonableness"
prong). The Second Circuit has relied on these sections for the principle that the
anti-fraud laws of the United States may be given extraterritorial reach whenever a
predominantly foreign transaction has "substantial effects" within the United States.
Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 262-63 (2d Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989).
59. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 22, § 18 with RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 58, § 403(1) (Restatement (Third) added limiting factor of rea-
sonableness). Section 403 of the Restatement (Third) provides as follows:
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present,
a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
a person or activity having connections with another state when the
exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unrea-
sonable is determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including,
where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e.,
the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory,
or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the
territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic ac-
tivity, between the regulating state and the person principally
responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that
state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other
states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desir-
ability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected
or hurt by the regulation;
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little U.S. law. 60 These limitations are necessary to prevent an
exercise of subject matter jurisdiction where there is a de
minimis "effect within the territory."'6 '
The Restatement (Third) also provides that U.S. courts
should consider the interests of foreign states before exercis-
ing jurisdiction over foreign parties.6 2 This situation arises
where two states could reasonably assert jurisdiction.63 The
Restatement (Third) provides that the state with the less com-
pelling interest should defer jurisdiction to the state with the
clearly stronger interest.64
In Plessey Company PLC v. General Electric Company PLC,65 a
district court applied the Restatement (Third)'s view of the ef-
fects test.6 6 A U.K. company, the target of a tender offer,
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political,
legal, or economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the tradi-
tions of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regu-
lating the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
(3) When more than one state has a reasonable basis for exercising jurisdic-
tion over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states are
in conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the
other state's interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant
factors, including those set out in Subsection (2), should defer to the
other state if that state's interest is clearly greater.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 58, § 403.
The drafters of section 403(2) used a reasonableness test because there are no
fixed rules in this area of the law, which develops on a case-by-case basis. See John-
son, Application of Federal Securities Laws to International Securities Transactions, 45 ALB. L.
REV. 890, 931 (1981) (warning against "parochial application" of U.S. laws to situa-
tions where essential fraudulent conduct occurred abroad).
60. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909
(D.C. Cir. 1984). In Laker, the court noted that it is not unreasonable to exercise
jurisdiction over conduct occurring outside the United States that is intended to
cause injury to protected U.S. interests, as long as the territorial effects within the
United States are not inconsequential. Id. at 923. See generally Meessen, Conflicts of
Jurisdiction Under the New Restatement, 50:3 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 54-60 (1987)
(discussing possible origins of reasonableness test).
61. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 58, § 402. For the text of section 402,
see supra note 58.
62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 58, § 403(3). For the text of section 403,
see supra note 59.
63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 58, § 403.
64. Id. § 403 comment e.
65. 628 F. Supp. 477 (D. Del. 1986).
66. Id. at 495-96.
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sought an order to compel a U.S. bidder to make certain filings
under the Williams Act.67 In applying the effects test of the
Restatement (Third), the district court concluded that an exer-
cise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable because only 1.6%
of the stockholders of the U.K. company were U.S. citizens and
residents, which caused insufficient effects within the United
States for subject matter jurisdiction.68
Refusing to exercise jurisdiction, the Plessey court also rec-
ognized the importance of foreign relations law as "part of the
jurisdiction inquiry."69 This represents an application of the
67. Id. at 479-81. The Williams Act, enacted in 1968, regulates tender offers.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1988). It added sections 13(d) and (e) and
14(d), (e), and (f) to the Securities Exchange Act.
68. Plessey, 628 F. Supp. at 496-97. The Plessey court wrote that
[o]n the one hand, we have a British bidder who seeks the Ordinary shares
of a British target through an offer carefully structured to avoid the channels
of American commerce; we have, in addition, the fact that 98.4% of the
target's potential voting shares are in hands not belonging to Americans, i.e.
the American shares will have almost no impact on the outcome of the con-
test even if they are tendered; and we have evidence that GEC has complied
with all aspects of British takeover practice. In addition, we have no logical
evidence of a motive by GEC to implicate United States interests .... On
the other hand, we have Plessey, a British target who invokes the protections
of the Williams Act not, it says, to stop the tender offer but rather to compel
disclosure to its ADR holders of the terms of an offer it has already charac-
terized as inadequate and ill-advised. It is at least possible that Plessey's
efforts in this litigation are motivated by a desire more to delay than to in-
form, more to gain an advantage than to preserve neutrality. This Court...
concludes that it would be a perversion of the principles of the Williams Act
to delay the processes of a quintessentially British takeover when American
investors and interests are but barely touched.
Id.
69. Id. at 494-96; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 58, § 403(3); see also Laker
Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 921 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(suggesting that "prerogative of a nation to control and regulate activities within its
boundaries is an essential, definitional element of sovereignty"); Mannington Mills,
Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting that court
should consider "[w]hether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if
made by the foreign nation under similar circumstances"); Timberlane Lumber Co.
v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting that "effect on United
States commerce, although necessary to the exercise of jurisdiction under the anti-
trust laws, is alone not a sufficient basis on which to determine whether American
authority should be asserted in a given case as matter of international comity and
fairness .... We believe that the field of conflict of laws presents the proper ap-
proach"). Cf IIT, Int'l Invest. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 921 (2d Cir. 1980)
(recognizing that "problem of conflict between our laws and that of a foreign govern-
ment is much less when the issue is the enforcement of the anti-fraud sections of the
securities laws than with such provisions as those requiring registration of persons or
securities"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 58, § 416 comment a (noting that "in-
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Restatement (Third)'s deference toward the state with a more
substantial interest in the transaction.70
II. CONSOLIDATED GOLD FIELDS PLC V MINORCO, S.A.
A. Factual Background
In London, on September 21, 1988, Minorco, S.A. ("Mi-
norco") announced its intention to purchase seventy-one per-
cent of the outstanding shares in Consolidated Gold Fields
PLC ("Gold Fields").7' Minorco is a Luxembourg societi
anonyme72 with over one-third of its holdings in the United
States.73 Minorco is primarily in the gold mining business. 4
terest in punishing fraudulent or manipulative conduct is entitled to greater weight
than are routine administrative requirements"); id. reporters' note 2 ("case for apply-
ing United States law ... would be stronger if it were designed to avert or to provide
a remedy for fraud than if designed merely to enforce an obligation to file or give
notice not directly associated with fraud").
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 58, § 403(3).
71. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Anglo Am. Corp., 698 F. Supp. 487
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, sub nom. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v.
Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29, on remand 713 F.
Supp. 1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Minorco Offer For Consolidated Gold Fields Plc, ORIGIN UNI-
VERSAL SERVICES, Sept. 21, 1989; Consolidated Cold Fields Resists Offer, PR NEWSWIRE,
Sept. 21, 1988. The newswire reported that "[t]he board of Gold Fields and its finan-
cial advisors, Schroders, having considered this announcement, are of the view that
this unwelcome offer has no financial justification and is devoid of commercial logic."
Id.
Minorco already had acquired in 1980 a 29.9% interest in Gold Fields. 11 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. D133, D146-47 (1989); see Appellant's Brief, supra note 2, at 2.
Discussing Minorco's contacts with the United States, the court noted that
Minorco [had] no employees in the United States, [did] not own or
lease any real property in the United States, [had] no bank accounts, post
office boxes or telephone listing here, [did] not solicit and never [had] solic-
ited business here, [had] never sued here, and [had] never applied for a
license to do business here.
Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 490-91.
72. Sociiti anonyme is defined as follows:
In French law originally a partnership conducted in the name of one of
the members; the others were strictly secret partners. To creditors of the
firm they came into no relation and under no liability. An association where
the liability of all the partners is limited. It had in England until lately no
other name than that of "chartered company," meaning thereby a joint-
stock company whose stockholders, by a charter from the crown, or a special
enactment of the legislature, stood exempted from any liability for the debts
of the concern, beyond the amount of their subscriptions.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1247 (5th ed. 1979).
73. Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 490. Minorco has a stake in the following U.S.
companies: Engelhard Corporation (30.3%), Inspiration Resources Corporation
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While its U.S. holdings are valued at US$650 million ,'75 Mi-
norco does not operate any of the U.S. companies in which it
has an interest. 76 Gold Fields is a British gold mining corpora-
tion with fifty percent of its US$2.4 billion of assets located in
the United States.77 While the ordinary shares of both Gold
Fields and Minorco are traded on several international stock
exchanges, they are not traded on any U.S. stock exchange."8
American depository receipts ("ADRs") 79 representing the or-
dinary shares of Gold Fields, however, were traded in the
United States on the over-the-counter ("OTC") market and
quoted through the National Association of Securities Dealers
Automated Quotations ("NASDAQ'). a°
Minorco's preparation of the tender offer included the use
of investment bankers, a public relations firm, and a law firm in
the United States."' Minorco began its US$4.9 billion tender
(56.2% effective interest, 43% voting interest), Abode Resources Corporation
(48.3% effective equity interest), and Danville Resources, Inc. (80.6%). Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 494.
76. Id. at 490.
77. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 255 (2d Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989), on remand 713 F. Supp. 1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
78. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Anglo Am. Corp., 698 F. Supp. 487
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, sub nom. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v.
Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989), on remand
713 F. Supp. 1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
79. An ADR is described as
[a] security issued by a US bank normally to a US resident against a holding
by the bank of ORDINARY SHARES in a foreign company. The holder of
the ADR acquires the right to the DIVIDENDS etc. of the foreign company.
The ADRs are themselves traded. The advantages of the arrangement are
that the CAPITAL MARKET is widened for non-US companies, while the
American desire for an easily-traded 'heavy' share can be satisfied. (An ADR
may be packaged so that it is title to many ordinary shares.)
THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 14 (3d ed. 1986) (emphasis in origi-
nal).
80. Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 490. NASDAQ is
a subscription computerized service, owned by the NASD [National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers]. It displays, on an electronic screen, current
quotes made by registered market makers in specific OTC securities.
WORDS OF WALL STREET: 2000 INVESTING TERMS DEFINED 142 (1983).
81. Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 491-92. Minorco engaged the legal services of
Shearman & Sterling in connection with the offer. Id. Further, Minorco asked Chem-
ical Bank to arrange financing of the takeover. Id. at 492. Minorco also hired Kelst &
Co., Inc., a New York public relations firm. Id.
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offer8 2 on October 4, 1988.83 When Minorco announced the
offer,84 it did not invite U.S. reporters to its press conference,
make any statements to the U.S. press, or answer telephone
calls from U.S. citizens or residents.85 On the top of the first
page of Minorco's prospectus announcing the offer were the
words "[n]ot for distribution in the USA. ' 8 6 Minorco mailed
the offer to every Gold Fields shareholder of record,87 but not
to ADR holders and beneficial owners in the United States.88
B. Opinion of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York
Immediately following Minorco's offer, Gold Fields initi-
ated suit against Minorco in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York, seeking a preliminary injunc-
82. On February 21, 1989, Minorco raised its offer to US$5.65 billion. Gold
Fields, 871 F.2d at 254 n.l.
83. Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 491.
84. Minorco's offer satisfied all U.K. regulatory requirements. Defendant's
Brief, supra note 2, at 9. The offer consisted of an offering circular and the listing
particulars and contained all required disclosures under U.K. law. Id.
85. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Anglo Am. Corp., 698 F. Supp. 487
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, sub nom. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v.
Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989), on remand
713 F. Supp. 1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); see Defendant's Brief, supra note 2 at 9-10.
86. Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 495; see Defendant's Brief, supra note 2, at 9-10
(stating that words "[n]ot for distribution in USA" was on top of press release).
87. Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 256. Gold Fields had 213,450,000 outstanding
shares. Id. at 255. Plaintiffs conceded that the number of Gold Fields shares owned
directly by U.S. citizens and residents is insignificant. Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 496
n.2.
88. Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 256. The 2.5% U.S. ownership of Gold Fields shares
was held as follows: approximately 50,000 shares were held directly by U.S. citizens
and residents, approximately 3.1 million shares were held indirectly through U.K.
nominee accounts, and about 2.15 million shares were owned through ADRs. Id. at
255; Appellee's Brief, supra note 2, at 4 n. 1. The offer instructed ADR holders to
tender their ADRs offshore. Id. at 19 n.17. Minorco did mail the offer to the U.S.
banks (offshore) and to trustees holding the shares instead of the ADR holders. Id.
U.S. law requires that reports by persons acquiring more than five percent of a
company's securities, including ADR companies, disclose "the background, and iden-
tity, residence, and citizenship of, and the nature of such beneficial ownership by,
such person and all other persons by whom or on whose behalf the purchases have
been or are to be effected ... the source and amount of the funds ... used in making
the purchases . . .any plans or proposals which such persons may have to liquidate
such issuer [of the securities] .. .information as to any contracts, arrangements or
understandings with any person with respect to any securities of the issuer . 15
U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l)(A)-(E) (1988).
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tion of the proposed merger.89 In its action, Gold Fields raised
two claims. First, Gold Fields claimed that Minorco's offer vio-
lated Rule lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission
("Rule lOb-5") 90 by not revealing certain material facts about
the bidders.9 ' Specifically, Gold Fields contended that Mi-
norco did not reveal that its organization was controlled by a
certain South African family with controlling interests in other
South African companies. 92 Second, Gold Fields asserted that
the tender offer would violate U.S. antitrust laws.93
89. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Anglo Am. Corp., 698 F. Supp. 487
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, sub noma. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v.
Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989), on remand
713 F. Supp. 1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Suit was filed on October 11, 1988. Amicus Cu-
riae Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission at 9, Consolidated Gold Fields
PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1989) (Nos. 88-7932, 88-7944) [herein-
after SEC Brief].
90. S.E.C. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990). This rule provides that
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
Id. § 240.10. See generally Thel, Regulation of Manipulation Under Section I 0(b): Security
Prices and the Text of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 359,
382-84 (discussing history of Rule lOb-5).
91. Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 490.
92. Id. at 492. Gold Fields claims that the Oppenheimer family controls the An-
glo Group because several members of the Oppenheimer family are board members
of Anglo Group, De Beers, and Minorco. See Appellee's Brief, supra note 2, at 5-7.
But see Appellant's Brief, supra note 2, at 9-10 (claiming Oppenheimer family does not
control these firms).
93. Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 490. The district court took note of the growing
legal precedent prohibiting a takeover target from asserting standing under antitrust
laws. Id. at 498; see A.D.M. Corp. v. Sigma Instruments, Inc., 628 F.2d 753, 754 (1st
Cir. 1980) (recognizing that "interests of the target corporation itself... are outside
of [Clayton Act] section seven's protection"); Burlington Indus. v. Edelman, 666 F.
Supp. 799 (M.D.N.C. 1987); Carter Hawley Hale Stores v. The Limited, 587 F. Supp.
246 (C.D. Cal. 1984); II AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW I 340.2i, at 399-401
(Supp. 1989); Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1445,
1471 (1985) (concluding that "target firm is, if anything, 'a beneficiary, not a victim,
of any antitrust injury' "); Easterbrook & Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender
Offers, 80 MicH. L. REV. 1155, 1156 (1982) (noting that "[t]hese suits are usually an
automatic strategy to resist a takeover for reasons wholly unrelated to antitrust inter-
ests, and antitrust interests are rarely involved"); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper
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Because the alleged securities violations involved parties
located outside the United States, the district court began its
inquiry by focusing on the extraterritorial application of the
Act and Rule lOb-5 to foreign transactions. 94 Using the con-
duct test, the district court found Minorco's conduct in the
United States-the hiring of U.S. professionals in connection
with the tender offer-to be "incidental" to the alleged fraud
and, therefore, an insufficient basis for subject matter jurisdic-
tion.9 5
Applying the effects test, the district court again con-
cluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the ef-
fect of the alleged fraud was insignificant.9 6 The district court
Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161,
1192 (1981) (realizing that "[i]n many cases, the expense and delay caused by the
litigation are sufficient to defeat the tender offer, even if the underlying claim is frivo-
lous").
94. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Anglo Am. Corp., 698 F. Supp. 487, 496
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, sub nom. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v.
Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989), on remand
713 F. Supp. 1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
95. Id. at 494-96 (citing Fidenas AG v. Compagnie Internationale, 606 F.2d 5,
10 (2d Cir. 1979)). The district court applied the conduct test, which bases subject
matter jurisdiction upon conduct within the United States that directly perpetrates
fraud. Id. at 496. This test relies on the principle of territoriality, meaning that a
nation has the right to prescribe conduct within its territory. See supra note 22 (dis-
cribing conduct test). "The conduct test does not center its inquiry on whether do-
mestic investors or markets are affected, but on the nature of conduct within the
United States as it relates to carrying out the alleged fraudulent scheme .... Psime-
nos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983). The court in
Fidenas wrote that
[iut is also clear that whatever the scope of the activity within the United
States that might emerge from discovery, the essential core of the alleged
fraud took place in Switzerland. Any activities in the United States were
clearly secondary and ancillary. Such relatively minor activity in the United
States does not alter the conclusion that subject matter jurisdiction is lack-
ing.
Fidenas, 606 F.2d at 8 (quoting lower court opinion); see Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen
& Co., 824 F.2d 27, 30-31 (D.C. Cir. 1987); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 58,
§ 402(l)(a) (defining conduct test).
96. Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 497. The district court applied the effects test
with the notion that there must be " 'a sufficiently serious effect upon United States
commerce to warrant assertion of jurisdiction for the protection of American inves-
tors.' Id. at 496 (quoting Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 209 (2d Cir.),
rev'd, 405 F.2d 215 (1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969)). Comparing
the maximum percentage (2.5%) of Gold Fields' U.S. securities holders to the per-
centage (1.6%) of U.S. investors in Plessey Co. PLC v. General Elec. Co. PLC, 628 F.
Supp. 477 (D. Del. 1986), the district court noted that the " 'exercise of federal court
jurisdiction appears ill advised.' " Id. at 497 (quoting Plessey, 628 F. Supp. at 494-95).
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held that the relative number of Gold Fields' shares owned by
U.S. investors was insignificant when compared to foreign
stock holdings.97 The district court, nonetheless, enjoined Mi-
norco from further purchases of Gold Fields' stock on the
ground that other plaintiffs, Newmont and Newmont Mining,98
had standing to sue under the antitrust laws. 99
C. Opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Minorco appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, alleging that the merger had been improperly
enjoined and that other plaintiffs had been incorrectly granted
standing under the antitrust laws.' 0 0 The court of appeals re-
versed the district court denial of standing and asserted subject
The relevant factor for the district court was that Minorco took "whatever steps it
could to assure that the tender offer documents would not reach Gold Fields' ADR
holders." Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 497. Thus, the district court concluded that the
"attenuated and potential" effect of the alleged fraud did not comport with
Schoenbaum. Id.
In addition, the district court viewed Gold Fields as factually similar to IIT, Int'l
Invest. Trust v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975) (involving foreign
investment trust, which was 0.2% U.S. owned, that sued corporation and individuals
for selling allegedly fraudulent securities to it). Judge Friendly, writing for the Sec-
ond Circuit in Vencap, concluded that "we cannot believe that Congress would have
intended the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws to apply if [defendant], in
London, had defrauded a British investment trust by selling foreign securities to it
simply because half of one per cent of its assets was held by Americans." Vencap, 519
F.2d at 1017.
97. Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 496-97.
98. See supra note 2 (discussing corporate relationship between Consolidated
Gold Fields and Newmont).
99. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Anglo Am. Corp., 698 F. Supp. 487, 498-
504 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd in part, rev 'din part, sub nom. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC
v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989), on remand
713 F. Supp. 1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);Judge Halts Minorco's Bid for Consgold, THE REUTER
Bus. REP., Oct. 24, 1988, (noting that "New York federal judge . . . temporarily
halted Minerals and Resources Corp Ltd.'s ['Minorco'] $4.9 billion bid for Britain's
Consolidated Gold Fields"); see Federal Court in New York blocks Minorco bid for Gold
Fields, Consolidated Gold Fields: Court Blocks Minorco Bid, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 25, 1988.
The newswire reported that a "U.S. Federal District Court ... has issued a prelimi-
nary injunction to prevent South African-controlled Minorco from proceeding with
its hostile takeover bid for Gold Fields." Id.
100. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 254-55 (2d
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989). Before the court of appeals delivered its
opinion, the British Monopolies and Mergers Commission and the European Com-
munity approved Minorco's application to proceed with its takeover attempt. Id. at
254 n. I.
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matter jurisdiction over the securities claims.10 1
The court of appeals did not challenge the district court's
finding that Minorco's conduct within the United States was
nothing more than incidental or merely preparatory. 0 2 Using
an effects test analysis similar to that employed in Schoenbaum,
however, the court determined that because "substantial ef-
fects" existed within the United States, the exercise of subject
matter jurisdiction was proper. 0 3 According to the court of
appeals, there was a direct and foreseeable effect on U.S. inves-
tors in the United States because Minorco knew that the British
nominees and ADR depository banks in the United States were
required by law to forward the tender offer to Gold Fields'
shareholders in the United States. 04 The Second Circuit also
compared the small number of U.S. shareholders at issue in
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. ,05 where the court exercised sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, to the number of U.S. shareholders in-
volved in Gold Fields.10 6 In Bersch, a foreign corporation also
denied and prohibited the distribution of its prospectus to U.S.
investors. 07  Nonetheless, twenty-two U.S. residents
purchased 41,936 shares, leading Judge Friendly to conclude
that the allegedly misleading documents must have been sent
into the United States.0 8 In Gold Fields, the court, relying on
Bersch, concluded that subject matter jurisdiction must exist be-
cause the number of U.S. investors involved was greater than
the number of U.S. investors involved in Bersch. °9
101. Id. at 263.
102. Id. at 261-62. The court of appeals immediately began its inquiry with the
effects test and did not address the conduct test. Id. at 261.
103. Id. at 262 (citing Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, rev'd on other
grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969)).
Although the court referred to section 402 of the Restatement (Third), the court
failed to reach the reasonableness prong of the effects test formulated in the Restate-
ment (Third). Id. at 261-62.
104. Id. at 262.
105. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
106. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 262 (2d
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989).
107. Bersch, 519 F.2d at 980.
108. Id. at 991-92; see Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 262.
109. Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 262.
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III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT SHOULD NOT HAVE HELD U.S.
SECURITIES LA WS APPLICABLE TO MINORCO'S
OFFER
A. The Effects Test
The Second Circuit exercised subject matter jurisdiction
in Gold Fields based on its application of the effects test. "o The
prohibitions of Rule lOb-5 apply to "any person,""' although
the Second Circuit has recognized that this language is not so
inclusive as to suggest that Congress intended to apply U.S.
securities laws to conduct throughout the world, where "any
person" bought or sold a single share of a foreign security." t2
In order to avoid too broad a reading of Rule 1Ob-5, the Sec-
ond Circuit has narrowed its application of this language to
apply only to acts committed abroad that have a substantial
and foreseeable effect within the United States.' '3 Specifically,
it was the court's interpretation of what constitutes a "substan-
tial effect" and "direct and foreseeable effect" that governed
the outcome of the case.' "4 Subject matter jurisdiction was not
proper because there was an unintended adverse effect on the
general economic interests of the United States.' 1 5
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook I6 should represent the outer lim-
its of the effects test."t 7 In Schoenbaum, the court exercised sub-
ject matter jurisdiction and found that there was a direct and
foreseeable effect in the United States when Canadian shares
were traded on the AMEX." 8 Schoenbaum, however, may be
distinguished from Gold Fields because in Gold Fields, none of
the target's shares were traded on any U.S. stock exchange." 9
110. Id. at 263.
111. S.E.C. Rule 1Ob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990). For the text of Rule 1Ob-
5, see supra note 90.
112. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d
Cir. 1972); see IIT, Int'l Invest. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 917 (2d Cir. 1980);
Plessey Co. PLC v. General Elec. Co. PLC, 628 F. Supp. 477, 494 (D. Del. 1986).
113. Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 262; see supra note 57 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Gold Fields' interpretation of Restatement (Third) language).
114. Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 262.
115. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 989 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
116. 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
117. See Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334; Thomas, supra note 40, at 458.
118. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d 215.
119. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Anglo Am. Corp., 698 F. Supp. 487, 490
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd in part, revd in part, sub nom. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v.
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Only ADRs representing shares of Gold Fields were traded in
the United States, making any connection with U.S. investors
more attenuated than in cases where ordinary shares are
traded on a U.S. stock exchange.1 2' A company is less directly
connected to the United States by the sale of ADRs because
ADRs are not issued by the company issuing the underlying
security.' 2 ' Instead, a U.S. bank purchases the ordinary shares
of a company on a foreign market and issues the ADRs in the
United States. 22
Although no shares were traded in the United States, the
Second Circuit concluded that Minorco's offer had foreseeable
effects within the United States. 23 This conclusion rested on
principles of agency and tort; the ADR holder may be viewed
as a principal, with the U.S. bank or U.K. trustees acting as
their agents. 24 According to the Second Circuit, a foreseeable
effect was created because Minorco knew that U.S. banks and
U.K. trustees were required by law to forward the offer to U.S.
investors. 25 It appears, however, that Minorco did in fact try
to avoid causing any effect within the United States because the
offer was not made to any U.S. citizens or residents, 126 the of-
fer stated "[n]ot for distribution in the USA," 12 7 the offer was
Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989), on remand
713 F. Supp. 1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
120. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 262-63 (2d
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989).
121. Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 494; see supra note 79 and accompanying text
(discussing nature of ADR market).
122. Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 494.
123. Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 262.
124. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A comment b (1977). The Re-
statement (Second) of Torts notes that "[i]f the actor knows that the consequences
are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is
treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result." Id.
125. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 262 (2d
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989).
126. Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 496-97; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
supra note 123, § 18(b) (explaining that express intent to cause harm in United States
not requirement under effects test); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 402(c) (1988)
(explaining that foreseeable act "has or is intended to have substantial effect within its
territory") (emphasis added).
127. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Anglo Am. Corp., 698 F. Supp. 487, 495
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, sub nom. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v.
Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989), on remand
713 F. Supp. 1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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not mailed into the United States, 28 Minorco had no offices or
employees in the United States, 29 and Minorco did not make
any statements to the U.S. press or answer telephone calls
from U.S. investors. 30
The requirement of "substantial" effects within the United
States is designed to exclude incidental effects that result in
the United States from transactions abroad.' 3' In securities
law, courts generally look at the percentage of U.S. investor
holdings in comparison to foreign investor holdings, the value
of the securities held by U.S. investors, and the total number of
U.S. citizens or residents affected.1 2 The Second Circuit de-
duced a substantial effect by comparing Gold Fields' 5.3 mil-
lion shares held by U.S. citizens or residents to the 41,936
shares held by U.S. citizens and residents in Bersch v. Drexel Fire-
stone, Inc. 133 In Bersch, however, the court based subject matter
jurisdiction upon Judge Friendly's conclusion that the defend-
ant had in fact sent the allegedly misleading documents into
the United States, not upon the number of shares held by U.S.
investors. 34 In addition, the facts in Gold Fields indicated that
Minorco structured its offer with the specific intent to avoid
distribution of the offer within the United States. 3 5
B. Concurring Exercises of Jurisdiction
U.S. courts should consider relevant principles of concur-
rent jurisdiction in deciding whether to exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over foreign securities claims.'3 6 Where two states
have valid bases for jurisdiction and one state has a clearly
greater interest in exercising jurisdiction, the state with the
128. Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 256.
129. Gold Fields, 698 F. Supp. at 490.
130. Id. at 492.
131. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing effects test).
132. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 990-91 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
133. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 262 (2d
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989).
134. Bersch, 519 F.2d at 991.
135. See Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Anglo Am. Corp., 698 F. Supp. 487,
492 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, sub nom. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC
v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989), on remand
713 F. Supp. 1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
136. Plessey Co. PLC v. General Elec. Co. PLC, 628 F. Supp. 477, 495-97 (D.
Del. 1986).
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lesser interest should defer jurisdiction to the other state so as
to avoid a conflict. 137 The United Kingdom had created its
own system for regulating tender offers and had a stronger in-
terest than the United States in regulating the Gold Fields
merger. 138 The nationality of the parties to the transaction,
the character of stock ownership involved, and the unforesee-
able and unintended nature of the effects of the transaction in
the United States all support the paramount U.K. interest in
the transaction.' 39 The British Mergers and Monopolies Com-
mission in fact had approved Minorco's bid for Gold Fields. 4 '
Given these considerations, the Second Circuit in Gold Fields
should have abstained from exercising subject matter jurisdic-
tion.
In addition, U.S. courts have recognized that an exercise
of subject matter jurisdiction over foreign transactions often
involves significant foreign policy decisions.14 ' Where such
foreign policy decision-making is involved, courts should defer
to the legislative and executive branches. 142  The U.S.
Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he responsibilities for as-
sessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the
struggle between competing views of the public interest are
not judicial ones: 'Our Constitution vests such responsibilities
in the political branches.' ",143
C. Jurisdiction to Enforce
As part of the judicial inquiry, courts should also distin-
guish between "jurisdiction to prescribe" and "jurisdiction to
137. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 58, § 403(3).
138. See SEC Brief, supra note 89, at 25; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 58,
§ 403(3).
139. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Anglo Am. Corp., 698 F. Supp. 487, 490-
91 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, sub nom. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC
v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989), on remand
713 F. Supp. 1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
140. Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 254 n.l (2d
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989).
141. See Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d
409, 421 (8th Cir. 1979) (concluding "that the finding of subject matter jurisdiction
in the present case is largely a policy decision").
142. See Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32-33 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
143. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 866 (1984) (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)).
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enforce" U.S. laws. 144 Jurisdiction to enforce the law is rele-
vant when a court "takes measures which, though initiated in
its own territory, are directed towards consummation, and re-
quire compliance, in the foreign state."'' 45 It has been argued
that although a court may have jurisdiction to prescribe the
law, it may not have jurisdiction to enforce that law.' 4 6 The
SEC suggested that a world-wide injunction such as that issued
in Gold Fields probably would be unenforceable. 47  Conse-
quently, the Gold Fields court should have considered applying
remedies with a "narrower extraterritorial effect" than a
world-wide injunction. 148
Alternative remedies tailored to protect U.S. investors
might include an SEC action to require corrective disclosure
by the offeror or a private action for damages. 49 Another op-
tion would be to permit the tender offer to continue, but to
"sterilize" the shares acquired by the bidder by restricting the
exercise of those shares' voting rights. 51 Such a result would
allow the target to remain a viable competitor and prevent the
bidder from exercising immediate adverse control."5 '
CONCLUSION
U.S. courts should abstain from exercising subject matter
jurisdiction over foreign securities claims where the transac-
tion involved is overwhelmingly foreign in character. Gold
Fields was an example of a foreign transaction that had an un-
foreseeable and incidental effect within the United States. U.S.
investors' interests should not be disregarded simply because
144. See SEC Brief, supra note 89, at 23 (noting "[j]urisdiction to enforce ...
describes a state's authority to compel compliance, or impose sanctions for noncom-
pliance, with its administrative or judicial orders"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra
note 22, §§ 10, 40; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 58, §§ 401(c), 431.
145. FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300,
1316 n.89 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International
Law, 1 REC. DES COURS 1, 128 (1964)).
146. FTC, 636 F.2d at 1316; see SEC Brief, supra note 89, at 22-26.
147. SEC Brief, supra note 89, at 25 (stating that SEC believed it would be un-
reasonable for U.S. court to exercise jurisdiction to enjoin Minorco's tender offer
worldwide).
148. Id. at 25.
149. Id.
150. See Schneiderman, Preliminary Relief in Clayton Act Section 7 Cases, 42 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 587, 589-90 (1973).
151. Id.
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foreign securities are involved; however, a foreign state's inter-
est in regulating corporate transactions should be accorded
greater weight in the U.S. courts' subject matter jurisdiction
formula than occurred in Gold Fields.
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